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Summary
We examine the effect of health on household expenditures in the Netherlands 
between 2009 and 2017, a period that is characterized by significant increases in out-
of-pocket medical expenditures for long-term care. How health affects household 
spending is an empirical question: on the one hand, health can affect a household’s 
budget through increased out-of-pocket medical expenditures or, for the working 
population, through reduced income. On the other hand, health can affect a house-
hold’s consumption preferences; help with cleaning, gardening, and home main-
tenance will likely become more valuable in situations of poor health, while leisure 
activities can be constrained by poor health. 
Using expenditure data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences 
(LISS), we estimate how total non-medical and medical expenditures change when 
health deteriorates, and how the relative shares of different expenditure categories 
vary with health. We estimate an expenditure-share demand system which includes 
health status, measured by general health, mental health, functional disabilities, and 
chronic diseases. We make use of within-household variation in health over time to 
allow for possible correlation between unobserved household-specific effects and 
health, such as time preferences that could influence both health and expenditures.
The results show that non-medical expenditures slightly decline after an adverse 
health shock, by between 3% (for general health) and 7% (for severe chronic condi-
tions). Medical expenditures increase, but they do not seem to drive the decline in 
non-medical expenditures. Instead, preferences seem to change after the onset of 
an adverse health shock, with more spending on housekeeping and less spending 
on leisure activities. Since the 2015 long-term care reform, which increased out-of-
pocket medical expenditures, unhealthy households spend less on leisure activities, 
a luxury good. A further increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditures may lead to 
the risk of unhealthy households having to cut back on necessities as well.
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Samenvatting
We onderzoeken het effect van gezondheid op bestedingen van Nederlandse 
huishoudens. We analyseren de periode 2009-2017, waarin eigen betalingen aan 
medische uitgaven zijn toegenomen. Hoe gezondheid de uitgaven van huishoudens 
beïnvloedt, is een empirische vraag. Gezondheid kan het budget van mensen beïnv-
loeden, doordat noodzakelijke medische uitgaven toenemen of doordat het inkomen 
van mensen onder de beroepsbevolking afneemt. Daarnaast kan gezondheid ook de 
voorkeuren van huishoudens beïnvloeden: hulp bij het schoonmaken, tuinieren en 
onderhoud aan het huis zal waarschijnlijk waardevoller worden in slechte gezond-
heid, terwijl recreatieve activiteiten soms afnemen vanwege een slechte gezondheid.
Met behulp van bestedingsgegevens uit een representatief huishoudpanel, schatten 
we hoe de totale niet-medische en medische uitgaven veranderen wanneer de 
gezondheid verslechtert en hoe de uitgaven aan verschillende uitgavencategorieën 
variëren met gezondheid. Daarbij maken we gebruik van variatie in gezondheid bin-
nen huishoudens over tijd. Op deze manier houden we rekening met correlatie tussen 
niet-waargenomen huishoudspecifieke kenmerken en gezondheid, zoals tijdsprefer-
enties, die zowel gezondheid als bestedingen kunnen beïnvloeden. We onderzoeken 
diverse maatstaven van gezondheid, namelijk algemene gezondheid, geestelijke 
gezondheid, functionele beperkingen en chronische aandoeningen.
De resultaten laten zien dat niet-medische uitgaven licht dalen na een verslech-
tering van de gezondheid, tussen 3% (voor algemene gezondheid) en 7% (voor 
ernstige chronische aandoeningen). Medische uitgaven nemen toe maar lijken de 
daling van niet-medische uitgaven niet te veroorzaken. In plaats daarvan lijken 
voorkeuren te veranderen na een negatieve gezondheidsschok, met meer uitgaven 
aan huishoudelijke taken en minder uitgaven aan vrijetijdsactiviteiten. Na de her-
vorming van de langdurige zorg in 2015, die tot verhoging van de eigen betalingen 
aan medische uitgaven leidde, besteden huishoudens met gezondheidsproblemen 
minder aan vrijetijdsactiviteiten – een luxe goed. Een verdere toename van de eigen 
bijdragen voor medische zorg kan daarom reden tot bezorgdheid zijn voor mensen 
met gezondheidsproblemen indien zij ook moeten gaan bezuinigen op noodzakelijke 
uitgaven.
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1. Introduction
Population aging leads to higher public spending on healthcare and long-term care in 
most Western countries.1 In recent years, several countries (especially those with large 
public long-term care spending, see e.g. Swartz, 2013) have therefore proposed or 
have already implemented reforms that make long-term care insurance less generous; 
see for example Mayhew, Karlsson & Rickayzen (2010) for the UK and Wouterse & Smid 
(2017) for the Netherlands. While more private financing of long-term care could 
make public long-term care expenditures sustainable, higher out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures may also lead to greater financial strain among the elderly and near- 
elderly who experience long-term care needs.
 This paper examines the effect of health on household expenditures in the 
Netherlands between 2009 and 2017, a period that is characterized by significant 
increases in out-of-pocket long-term care expenditures. The Dutch government aims 
to move care out of the nursing home and to increase the use of home care. Elderly 
people live longer in their own homes, and this motivated the government to transfer 
the responsibility of long-term care to municipalities as from January 2015. Domestic 
care and personal care are no longer financed by a national scheme, and the pro-
vision of care may now differ from one municipality to another. The 2015 long-term 
care reform was also accompanied by significant budget cuts and thus implied a shift 
away from publicly provided care to more individual responsibility. This leads to the 
question how people react to higher out-of-pocket long-term care expenditures.2
 While the focus of this paper is on the expenditure patterns of retired households, 
we will also consider households of working age. This gives a broader perspective 
on the development of expenditures over the lifecycle and on the association with 
health. How health affects household spending is an empirical question. On the one 
hand, health changes can affect a household’s budget through necessary out-of-
pocket medical expenditures or, for the working population, through reduced income. 
García-Gómez, Van Kippersluis, O’Donnell & Van Doorslaer (2013) show that a health 
shock (measured by an acute hospitalization) on average results in a 5% percent 
1 Expenditures on public health and long-term care have increased from 3.5% of GDP in 1970 to 
7% of GDP in 2010 on average in the OECD. They are expected to rise further in the future (OECD, 
2013).
2 In recent years, the funding of the Dutch healthcare system has also been subject to reform. In 
2012 notable cuts were made in the basic healthcare package, resulting in, among other things, 
less compensation for physiotherapy and psychological consultation for mental health prob-
lems. In 2013 mandatory deductibles in health insurance were increased from EUR 220 per year 
in 2012 to EUR 360 in 2013. Since that same year, common mobility devices are no longer cov-
ered in the basic healthcare package. 
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reduction in personal income in the Netherlands. On the other hand, health can 
affect a household’s consumption preferences. Help with cleaning, gardening, and 
home maintenance, for instance, may become more valuable in situations of poor 
health, while leisure activities can become less attractive.
 Previous research identified various ways to establish how the marginal utility of 
consumption varies with health; see Finkelstein, Luttmer & Notowidigdo (2009). To 
determine whether a person’s marginal utility of non-medical consumption varies 
with health, Finkelstein, Luttmer & Notowidigdo (2013) compared changes in subjec-
tive well-being after a health shock among Americans with different consumption 
levels (derived from permanent income). They found that the marginal utility of con-
sumption declines after the onset of a chronic condition, which should express itself 
in reduced consumption. Kools & Knoef (2017) examined the impact of health shocks 
on financial well-being for a sample from European countries and found that physical 
health problems lead to a higher marginal utility of consumption, while cognitive 
health problems lead to a lower marginal utility of consumption. The contrary find-
ings from the US and Europe could be due to different spending patterns. If Europeans 
consider recreation a more essential consumption good, it may require more money 
for them to continue these activities in poor health. Spending on transportation, on 
the other hand, is relatively high in the US (Banks, Blundell, Levell & Smith, 2016), 
and the question arises whether Americans continue to incur these costs when their 
health deteriorates. If not, this may partly explain the negative health state depen-
dence of consumption seen in the US. It is also difficult to account for medical expen-
ditures of Americans who are not fully covered by health insurance or even uninsured 
(see Finkelstein, Luttmer & Notowidigdo, 2013).
 An alternative approach, which we apply in this paper, is to examine the 
relationship between consumption and health when disposable income and 
non-discretionary medical spending are kept constant. Shapiro (2009) used panel 
data on non-medical consumption for the US and found a small negative effect of 
poor health on consumption.3 One challenge in estimating the effect of health on 
consumption preferences from observed expenditures is to disentangle the effect 
3 To gain insight into the financial position of elderly persons, several studies have examined the 
evolution of wealth and income of elderly households, e.g. De Bresser & Knoef (2015), Van 
 Ooijen, Alessie & Kalwij (2015), and Knoef et al. (2016) for the Netherlands. Several papers have 
tried to explain the motives that underlie the observed savings decisions of households by 
estimating the utility parameters of a lifecycle model that also allows for an effect of health on 
the marginal utility of consumption. Lillard & Weiss (1997) found a positive effect of health on 
the marginal utility of consumption, although this effect could be driven by higher out-of-
pocket medical expenditures. De Nardi, French & Jones (2010) did not find evidence of health 
state dependence.
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on the value of consumption from other motivational factors to change spending, 
such as a bequest. For example, a decline in consumption following an unexpected 
negative health shock may be evidence for decreasing marginal utility of consumption 
in poor health, but it may also operationalize the bequest motive. Moreover, health 
may have a differential impact on different spending categories. The composite effect 
of health on consumption depends on the relative importance of these categories in 
different health states. We address both issues, by examining the impact of health 
on total non-medical spending and on spending on different expenditure categories 
by estimating a demand system.4 Our approach is related to recent studies conducted 
by Banks et al. (2016), Hong, Pijoan-Mas & Rios-Rull (2015), and Babiarz & Yilmazer 
(2017). Banks et al. (2016) compared non-durable expenditures in the US and the 
UK between 1988 and 2009 and found large differences between the consumption 
profiles of households in these two countries. They reported an average annual 
rate of decline in spending on non-durable goods between the ages of 45 and 75 
of 1% in the US and over 3% in the UK. By closely examining various factors, they 
found that about one fourth of the gap could be attributed to the level of medical 
expenditures, which are considerably higher in the US than in the UK. The remainder 
of the gap is explained by the uncertainty that households have about future medical 
expenditures. American households are inclined to save much more, hence consume 
less, in their earlier years for precautionary reasons. Consequently, at older ages, they 
have more resources left to spend as much of these savings turn out be superfluous. 
Roughly speaking, one could say that the long-term care system in the Netherlands 
is moving in the direction of individual responsibility. Higher deductibles for health 
insurance mean that the Dutch face the risk of higher out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Furthermore, as entry into nursing homes is discouraged and home care is not fully 
covered by insurance, individuals shoulder the responsibility for more aspects of care. 
We can therefore expect to see more precautionary saving in the future.
4 A third approach is to look at the willingness to pay for specific insurance coverage, such as 
insurance that covers geriatric care. A person’s willingness to pay for such insurance is an indi-
cation that consumption becomes more valuable when health deteriorates; see also Van Ooi-
jen, De Bresser & Knoef (2017), who examined the willingness to pay for geriatric care and its 
determinants.
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2. Data
We have drawn data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences 
(LISS) for the 2009-2017 period. LISS is an internet-based panel of approximately 4,500 
households that is representative for the non-institutionalized Dutch population. 
It is administered by CentERdata, which is affiliated with Tilburg University.5 Each 
month, all household members in the LISS panel receive a questionnaire on a variety 
of topics, including an annual health survey and a bi-annual survey on consumption. 
The survey on consumption, which was first fielded in 2009 and repeated in 2010, 
2012, 2015, and 2017, records average monthly expenditures over the past year on a 
broad set of expenditure categories. It closely resembles the derived categories from 
the budget survey conducted by Statistics Netherlands, except for consumer durables 
such as vehicles and furniture. In the budget survey, consumers are asked to maintain 
a record of all expenditures over a one-week period (and spending on large-amount 
items over a period of four weeks). While eliciting expenditures in a longitudinal 
household survey cannot be as detailed as a diary-based budget survey, it has 
proven to provide a comprehensive measure of household expenditures; see e.g. 
Browning, Crossley & Weber (2003) and Crossley & Winter (2014). The fact that the same 
households are followed over time allows us to examine the evolution of household 
spending over a relatively long time span.
 The survey on consumption first asks all household members aged 16 and above 
about expenditures in twelve categories that cannot be assigned to individual per-
sons, such as food expenditures, and next asks them about personal expenditures in 
eight categories. For non-assignable expenditures, we use the value reported by the 
key respondent of the household, defined as either the person who owns or rents the 
property or, if several members are listed as owners or renters, the main earner. We 
use the reported value of the spouse if the key respondent does not know how much 
the household spends on a specific category. We calculate total expenditures as the 
sum of non-assignable expenditures plus personal expenditures of the key respon-
dent and, if applicable, the spouse. Following the literature, we exclude financial 
transfers, such as alimony payments and loan repayments, from our consumption 
measure; see e.g. Attanasio & Weber (1995) and Aguiar & Bils (2015). We also exclude 
5 CentERdata uses several approaches to ensure the representative character of the panel. First, 
households are recruited through address-based sampling to avoid self-selection into the 
panel. Second, household members receive an incentive to complete a questionnaire, which 
keeps attrition to a minimum. Third, households without a computer or internet connection 
are provided with these facilities.
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expenditures on housing services because homeowners are not asked about the rental 
equivalent of their property and because the survey contains insufficient information 
about net housing wealth to impute rents. We discount the value of expenditures to 
the 2012 price level using the consumer price index.
 For the empirical analysis, a change in the design of the questionnaire that took 
place in 2015 restricts us from using all categories in all waves. As from 2015, personal 
(nondurable) expenditures are combined into a single category, except for out-of-
pocket medical expenditures. This redesign not only resulted in fewer categories – we 
no longer separately observe spending on clothing, personal leisure, and food eaten 
away from home – but also in somewhat lower reported total personal expenditure. 
It thus seems that people report personal spending less accurately when asked about 




We started with a sample of 4,870 households where the key respondent and, if 
applicable, the spouse completed the survey on consumption and where the key 
respondent did not change over the years. We excluded 280 households due to 
missing or unreasonably low disposable household income, i.e. less than 70% of the 
social minimum, leaving us with a sample of 4,590 households.6
 To calculate total household expenditures, we made sure that the key respondent 
or the spouse completed the survey on non-assignable expenditures and that both, 
if applicable, reported personal expenditures. For each category of non-assignable 
expenditures, we recorded the value reported by the partner if the key respondent 
reported ‘do not know’. This left us with 4,247 households.7 We further restricted 
our sample to households with non-zero expenditures in the following essential 
spending categories: utilities, insurance, and food consumed at home. In total, 4,014 
households satisfied this criterion. We changed the four highest expenditure values 
to the next highest value within each spending category to make total expenditures 
more robust against misreporting. We also corrected misreporting by a factor of 10 or 
100 in a spending category by comparing reported expenditure across survey waves. 
Finally, we excluded a few outliers: five households with the highest (or lowest) level 
6 We corrected a few outliers by comparing net household income across adjacent survey waves.
7 We do not consider personal expenditures of children living at home or other household mem-
bers whose reported expenses are rather low. Moreover, including them would drastically 
reduce the value of the sample because of the high likelihood that at least one of the children 
(or another household member) would not answer the survey on consumption.
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of expenditures and five households with the highest (or lowest) expenditure to 
income ratios. We thus ended up with a sample of 3,978 households.
 For about 83% of our sample, i.e. 3,300 households, we were able to merge the 
questionnaire on health for both the key respondent and, if applicable, the spouse. 
We observed 2,116 households (i.e. 6,738 household-year observations) for at least two 
waves, which constituted our final sample.
2.2 Health
All participants of the LISS panel fill in a detailed health questionnaire at the end of 
each year, two or three months after their completion of the consumption survey. 
Since health is a diffuse concept with many dimensions, we apply various measures of 
health: general health, mental health, functional disability, and chronic diseases.
 General health is based on the question: “How would you describe your health, 
generally speaking?” Respondents rate their health on a five-point scale ranging from 
poor to excellent. We consider someone to be in poor general health when the person 
reported being in poor or moderate health.
 Mental health is based on the RAND Mental Health Inventory (MHI-5), which 
applies a score between 0 and 100, where 100 represents poor mental health. We 
consider someone to be in poor mental health when the reported MHI-5 score is 
above 40 (which is the median MHI-5 score among persons in our sample who report 
using depression medication).
 Functional disability, i.e. the inability to perform daily activities, is measured in 
two ways. First, respondents indicate their overall level of functional disability by 
answering the question: “To what extent did your physical health or emotional prob-
lems hinder your daily activities over the past month, for instance in going for a walk, 
walking upstairs, dressing yourself, washing yourself, or visiting the toilet?”, with five 
response options ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’.
 Second, respondents are presented an extensive list of activities which are import-
ant for functioning in daily life. This set of activities contains ten mobility items and 
thirteen activities of daily living (ADL) items and instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADL) items. Each item has five response options, ranging from the ability to perform 
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a task without any trouble to being unable to perform the task at all.8 Assessing one’s 
ability to perform many different tasks along a broad (five-point) scale provides a 
detailed measure of functional disability. Being fully able is represented by a min-
imum score of zero, while a maximum score of 92 indicates that a person is unable 
to perform any of the listed activities. We consider a person to have poor functional 
ability when the functional disability score is above 15 (which is the median score 
among persons in our sample who report that health problems to some extent hinder 
their functioning in daily life).
 Finally, the presence of a chronic disease is based on two questions: first, an 
affirmative answer to the question whether someone takes medicines for a specific 
disease, and second whether a physician has diagnosed a disease in the past year. 
Following the methodology of Smith (1999), we distinguish between the following 
eight chronic diseases: hypertension, high blood cholesterol, diabetes, cancer9, heart 
disease, stroke, chronic lung disease, and arthritis. We consider a person chronically 
ill if he or she has more than two chronic conditions (to indicate comorbidities). We 
also considered the occurrence of more than one chronic condition. 
 One reason why it is important to look at various measures of health is that 
different health problems require different combinations of cure and care. For 
instance, we expect that functional limitations lead to demand for extra care and 
support. Especially for older individuals such care is likely to coincide with permanent 
changes in one’s lifestyle. Our measure of mental health, on the other hand, focuses 
on depression and other issues that can at least be alleviated by curative medicine. 
Such distinctions are important because permanent lifestyle changes and temporary 
curable problems may impact consumption in different ways.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows average monthly non-medical household expenditures for different 
age and birth cohorts. Non-medical household expenditures increase between the 
ages of 25 and 45. After age 45 they stay constant for singles and decline somewhat 
for couples.
8 The ADL items are: dressing, walking, bathing, eating, using the toilet, and getting in and out 
of bed. The IADL items are: preparing meals, shopping, telephoning, taking medicine, house-
keeping, wayfinding, and performing administrative tasks. The mobility items are: walking 100 
meters, sitting for two hours, getting up from a chair, walking (several) stairs, kneeling, 
stretching arms, moving a chair, carrying groceries such as a heavy bag, picking up a small coin 
from a table.
9 One can argue whether cancer is a chronic disease, it depends on the type of cancer whether it 
has long-term consequences for expenditures.
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 Table 1 lists the various consumption categories and shows expenditure shares 
across categories for several age groups. Households consisting of older persons 
spend relatively little on food and transportation but more on house cleaning and 
gardening, medical services, and gifts compared to young households. Table 1 also 
shows financial satisfaction (“How satisfied are you with your financial situation?”), 
measured on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not satisfied) to 10 (completely sat-
isfied). Financial satisfaction is higher among two-person households than among 
single-person households and is higher for older age groups. 
 Figure 2 shows the distribution of per person out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
for different age groups. Two things are noticeable: first, median out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures have increases since the January 2015 reform and the higher 
mandatory deductibles that have been introduced, particularly for older persons, and 
second, the risk of having high out-of-pocket expenditures has increased substan-
tially since the reform. This holds in particular for older persons. Note that for quite 
a substantial number of individuals the out-of-pocket expenditures are higher than 
the mandatory deductible. 
 Table 2 shows, as expected, that the prevalence of chronic diseases and functional 
disabilities is higher among individuals aged 65 and older than among the working 
age population, while mental health problems are more common among the work-
ing-age population. About one third of the elderly and less than 10% of the working 
age population in our sample have more than two chronic conditions. For general 
self-reported health, we observe much less of a difference in health between both 
age groups. This is probably because the perception of good health changes as people 
age, as shown by Lindeboom & Van Doorslaer (2004) and Van Ooijen, Alessie & Knoef 
(2016).
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3. Empirical model
To examine how much of the development of consumption over the lifecycle is 
explained by changes in health (and how much by other factors), we estimate the 
following linear regression model:
 
lnCht =β0+β1Hht +agehtβage + yearhtβ y +Dhtδ1+vh+εht , (1)
where the dependent variable Cht represents the logarithm of total non-durable 
expenditures for household h in period t and Hht depicts poor health. Health is 
expressed by an indicator variable, where a household is in poor health when either 
the key respondent or, if applicable, the spouse is in poor health. We estimate 
separate models for different indicators of health. ageht is a vector representing 
dummies for different age groups; yearht is a vector of dummy variables for the survey 
waves; and Dht is a vector that represents household demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics, including marital status, the number of household members, 
the logarithm of income, homeownership status, retirement status, and a dummy 
variable denoting whether the key respondent attained higher education. The error 
term is decomposed into two components: vh is a time-invariant unobserved house-
hold-specific effect (potentially correlated with the regressors), and ɛht is an idiosyn-
cratic error term, which for example represents measurement error in consumption as 
well as omitted factors that affect expenditures.
 To allow for possible correlation between unobserved household-specific effects 
and health, we use within-household variation in health to estimate the coefficients. 
We accomplish this by fixed effects estimation.
 Because of recent reforms, out-of-pocket medical expenditures have risen 
substantially since 2015 (as shown in Figure 2). We therefore expect that a change 
in health not only influences the consumption preferences of households, but also 
their budget (due to necessary medical expenditures). To address this, we include the 
logarithm for out-of-pocket medical expenditures (ln OOPht) as a covariate in some 
specifications of the regression model. 
 After examining the effect of health on total expenditures, we explore how health 
affects the allocation of expenditures across different categories conditional on a 
given level of total expenditure. We use the well-known Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) developed by Deaton & Muellbauer (1980); however, given the relatively short 
period of analysis, we assume that relative prices have been constant over time. 
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This model allows us to examine in detail how expenditure shares vary with health. 





k + yearhtβ y
k +Dht
k δ1+β2
k lnCht +εht , (2)
where wkht is the budget share of household h at time t for category k, and Cht is total 
non-durable spending on all goods/services included in the demand system, deflated 
by the consumer price index at time t. Parameters are restricted to ensure that the 
budget shares add up to one. The model is estimated by three-stage least squares, a 
combination of instrumental variable regression and seemingly unrelated regression 
since the total non-durable spending variable Cht is included in both sides of the 
equation and therefore regarded as endogenous. We use net household income 
as an instrument, which is standard in the literature. It is assumed that income is 
correlated with total non-durable spending but unrelated to the budget share (other 
than via total non-durable spending).
 The dependent variables in this system are the expenditure shares of the cat-
egories explained earlier. By design, the system shows how increased demand for 
one group of goods is financed by decreased demand for another group. Hence, 
differences in budget allocations to the specific consumption categories because of a 
change in health allow us to identify which categories are complements to and which 
substitutes for poor health. Moreover, they allow us to examine and compare these 
health-related shifts before and after the January 2015 reform.
 Finally, we examine whether poor health affects a household’s financial satisfac-
tion through an increase in out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expenditures. We estimate a 
similar linear regression model as equation (1): 
Fin.satht =β0 +β1Hht +agehtβage + yearhtβ y +Dhtδ1+β2 lnCht +β3 lnOOPht+vh+εht , (3)
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4. Results
4.1 Total expenditures
Table 3 shows us the relation between health and non-medical household expen-
ditures. The fixed effects estimation results show that poor general health leads to 
a reduction in non-medical consumption of about 3%. When the possible channel 
through necessary out-of-pocket medical expenditures is accounted for, by con-
trolling for medical spending in columns 3 and 4, the results stay virtually the same. 
This suggests that the consumption of non-medical goods becomes less valuable in 
poor health, although the effect is only small. Thus, necessary out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures, on average, do not seem to result in financial strain. Such result is 
plausible in our system of universal insurance for virtually all medically necessary 
procedures and generous long-term care, especially in the first years of our sample.
 All specifications include age effects to capture the lifecycle pattern in consump-
tion, as well as time-specific fixed effects.10 To derive an unbiased lifecycle pattern it 
is important to account for cohort effects: older cohorts may for instance have a lower 
lifetime income, which, regardless of their age, results in a lower level of consump-
tion. We accomplish this by estimating the model with fixed effects (i.e. columns 
2 and 4). Column 4 shows that non-medical consumption rises by approximately 
5.5% between the age categories 45-54 and 55-64 and decline slightly (but not 
significantly) thereafter. Thus, in addition to health, the data do not provide sufficient 
evidence that aging leads to lower non-medical consumption. Column 4 further 
shows that between 2009 and 2017 consumption declined by about 18%, which likely 
reflects the aggregate economic situation over the period of analysis.
 In Table 4, we repeat our analysis for different health measures. The results show 
that for households where at least one person gets a health problem that limits a 
person’s functioning in daily life, consumption declines by 4.9%. A relatively large 
reduction of 7.3 % is also found for households where at least one member has more 
than two chronic conditions. Consumption does not respond significantly to the onset 
of mental health problems.
 Table 5 examines potential heterogeneous effects before and after the 2015 long-
term care reform, by estimating in equation 1 the separate effects of poor health for 
the periods before and after 2015. Only the fixed effect results are reported in the 
table. For the period after the 2015 reform, compared to the period before the reform, 
10 In FE models these age effects are identified off individuals who cross one of the age thresh-
olds in the model.
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we find slightly (but not significantly) larger (i.e. less negative) coefficients for general 
and mental health, and similar coefficients for functional problems and chronic 
illness. The results thus suggest that, although out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
increased after January 2015, they do not force households with at least one member 
with health problems to cut back on non-medical expenditures. This implies that 




To examine how a change in health affects expenditures across different categories we 
estimate a demand system as specified in equation (2). We again distinguish between 
different definitions of health. We first examine whether households with at least one 
person in poor health allocate their consumption differently compared to households 
without health problems.
 Figure 3 shows the estimated coefficients of pooled OLS models for different 
definitions of health among the different categories. For the categories transport and 
leisure, the share of consumption is negatively associated with most measures of 
health – though this relationship is not statistically significant for some definitions 
of health. Households where at least one person has a mental health problem do not 
spend less on transportation than households without mental illnesses, suggesting 
that mental health problems do not affect their mobility. For leisure, having chronic 
diseases is not associated with lower spending. The share of consumption spent 
on housekeeping and gardening is positively associated with health problems. 
Households with serious chronic conditions (i.e. three or more conditions) have a 
higher share of out-of-pocket medical expenses than households without chronic 
illness. For the other measures of poor health, we do not observe a significant associ-
ation. Also, for utilities, insurance, and food at home no association between health 
and consumption shares is found. All changes in expenditure shares are smaller than 
2 percentage points.
 Next, we focus on the within-household change in health over time to rule out 
the confounding influence of time-constant unobserved factors that are correlated 
with health. Figure 4 shows both the between-household estimates (left) and the 
within-household estimates (right). The between-household estimates show a very 
similar pattern compared with the pooled OLS results of Figure 3: in poor health, 
11 The results are virtually identical in a specification that does not control for medical 
 expenditures. 
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households spend less on transport and leisure and more on housekeeping, garden-
ing, and medical care. When we focus on within-household variation compared to 
between-household variation, the most important difference is that transportation 
increases with health problems (although the increase is not statistically significant), 
while on average households in poor health spend relatively less on transportation 
than households in good health. This difference may be due to unobserved charac-
teristics that are different between households in poor and in good health. Another 
possible explanation is that between-household variation captures the long-run 
consequences of changes in health better than variation over time, especially since 
our panel only spans eight years and households are rarely observed across the entire 
period. Furthermore, the ‘signal to noise’ ratio is smaller when investigating within 
variation (as we just use the deviations from the mean as signal). Measurement error 
in health status is therefore a greater problem in estimates of within variation and 
may introduce attenuation bias.12 In the remainder of the analysis we therefore only 
report the cross-sectional (pooled OLS) estimates.
 In Figures 5 to 7 we study heterogeneity in the relationship between health 
and disaggregate spending. We compare the working age population with older 
households, couples with single-person households, and the period before and after 
the 2015 reform. Figure 5 shows pooled OLS estimates for households where the key 
respondent is younger than 65 or aged 65 or older. We see that the positive rela-
tionship between the expenditure share on utilities and poor health is driven by the 
working-age population (who spend less time at home when healthy). The expen-
diture share for housekeeping is relatively high for old households with functional 
restrictions; younger disabled persons are more likely to have a spouse or cohabiting 
children who can help around the house. When we compare the expenditure shares 
of single-person households with couples (see Figure 6), we note that singles are 
much more responsive to changes in health (except for the budget share allocated 
to leisure, which also changes for couples). Single-person households in poor health 
allocate on average a smaller share of their budget to food at home and transport, 
but spend more on housekeeping, leisure, and utilities (the latter is only significant 
for general health). Couples only seem to reduce their expenses for leisure. 
 Figure 7 compares the relationship between poor health and budget shares, in the 
periods before and after the reform of long-term care. It shows that, after the reform, 
households with at least one person in poor health spend more on out-of-pocket 
12 Van Ooijen, Alessie & Knoef (2016) show that self-reported health is much less persistent than 
objective health from administrative medical records, which they ascribe to measurement error 
in self-reported health.
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medical expenditures. The budget share increases by 1 to 2 percentage points, which 
is a substantial increase relative to the low baseline budget shares (see Table 1). 
However, as we showed in the previous section, out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
do not significantly influence total non-medical expenditures, which we would 
expect if higher out-of-pocket medical expenditures lead to more financial strain. 
On the other hand, the figure shows that, in the period after the reform, people in 
poor health spend somewhat less (but not significantly different from zero) on leisure, 
which is a luxury good on which households can economize.
4.3 Financial satisfaction
The results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 show that poor health leads to slightly lower 
non-medical expenditures and slightly higher medical expenditures (at least for 
chronic diseases in the fixed effects results). We also find that after the 2015 reform 
households in poor health do not adjust their overall consumption much and that 
they substitute only a small part of their budget away from leisure towards medical 
expenditures. This suggests that the financial situation of households is barely 
affected by increased out-of-pocket medical expenditures after 2015.
 To examine whether a change in health affects the self-perceived financial sit-
uation of households we estimate equation 3 using a linear model, where financial 
satisfaction is the dependent variable (measured on an 11-point scale from 0, not sat-
isfied, to 10, completely satisfied). Table 6 shows that after controlling for disposable 
income, poor general health has a significant negative effect on financial satisfaction. 
In line with the previous section, the coefficients do not change after we control 
for out-of-pocket medical expenditures and non-medical expenditures. Potential 
explanations for the remaining negative effect of health on financial satisfaction are 
an increase in the bequest motive or a reduction in the overall satisfaction of persons 
in poor health. In other words, a person’s reporting behavior may become more 
pessimistic. 
 Table 7 shows the results for other definitions of health. As was the case for 
general self-assessed health, poor health measured by mental health problems 
relates negatively to financial satisfaction, but chronical conditions and functional 
disabilities do not affect a household’s financial satisfaction. For all specifications, 
controlling for the level of medical expenditures does not affect the results. When we 
study potential heterogeneity of poor health on financial satisfaction, it appears that 
for all definitions of health there are no significant differences between the period 
before and after the reform (see Table 8). This piece of evidence also suggests that the 
reform did not lead to greater financial strain among households with medical needs.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the effects of health on spending patterns. We 
used data on expenditures by Dutch households between 2009 and 2017 and investi-
gated in what way total non-medical and medical expenditures change when health 
deteriorates. Furthermore, we estimated a demand system to find out how the shares 
on different expenditure categories vary with health status. Finally, we showed how 
financial satisfaction changes with health. Health is multidimensional, and our data 
allowed us to investigate several measures of health, such as general self-reported 
health, mental health, functional disability, and chronic diseases.
 The results show that, when the health of one or more household members 
worsens, non-medical expenditures decline slightly, by between 3% (for general 
health) and 7% (for severe chronic illnesses). Medical expenditures increase after a 
health shock, at least for households with chronical diseases and especially after the 
2015 long-term care reform. Increases in medical expenditures, however, do not seem 
to drive the decline in non-medical expenditures after a health shock. This suggests 
that preferences change after a health shock (i.e. households in poor health value 
non-medical consumption less), or that bequest motives become stronger in poor 
health.13 The results also show that, in addition to health, there is no clear evidence 
that aging leads to lower non-medical consumption.
 Compared to households in good health, those in poor health spend more on 
housekeeping and relatively less on leisure (this applies particularly to couples, who 
spend less on family vacations). Households in poor health spend less on transporta-
tion than those in good health, but after a change in health status we do not find a 
drop in relative transportation expenditures. Transportation expenditures even seem 
to increase after a negative (mental or general) health shock. These contrary results 
may reflect differences between short-term and long-term effects of health problems, 
or they may be due to unobserved differences between households in poor and good 
health. Also single person households seem to be more responsive to changes in 
health compared to couples.
 In the Netherlands the trend is that households become increasingly responsible 
for the financial effects of their health and long-term care. The question arises 
then whether this results in greater financial stress and how people react on this. 
13 Indeed, a sub-analysis of the budget shares over the period 2009-2012 shows that elderly per-
sons with functional disabilities or severe chronic conditions spend on average a 1.5 percentage 
point higher share of their budget on gifts than their healthy counterparts (figure 8). While 
bequest motives may explain this, more research is needed to explore this mechanism.
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The long-term care reform in 2015 in the Netherlands has increased out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures. However, we did not find a decline in the financial satisfaction 
of unhealthy households relative to healthy households after the reform. On the other 
hand, we did find that expenditures on leisure were cut more by unhealthy house-
holds after the reform compared to healthy households, which may justify concern.
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Figure 1: Average non-medical household expenditures over the lifecycle for different 
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Source: LISS 2009-2017. Table 1 shows the composition of non-medical household expenditures. 














































































































Source: LISS 2009-2017. Each line shows the 10th percentile, first quartile, median, third quartile, 
and 90th percentile. Medical expenditures of couples are divided by two. 
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Source: LISS 2009-2017. 90% and 95% confidence intervals are reported. 
Figure 4: Health and consumption shares, between-households estimates (left), and 
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Figure 5: Health and consumption shares, cross-sectional estimates.
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Source: LISS 2009-2017. 90% and 95% confidence intervals are reported. 
Figure 6: Health and consumption shares, cross-sectional estimates.
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Figure 7: Health and consumption shares, cross-sectional estimates.
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Source: LISS 2009-2017. 90% and 95% confidence intervals are reported. 
 
Figure 8: Health and consumption shares, cross-sectional estimates, 2009-2012
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Table 1: Average share of total non-durable expenditures and financial satisfaction by 
age and marital status, 2009–2012.
  Single-person household  Two-person household 
Category  < 55  55-64  65-74  > 74  < 55  55-64  65-74  > 74
Household  74.6  76.1  76.3  73.6  77.5  77.7  78.1  78.3 
– Food at home  20.6  20.0  19.0  18.3  20.1  20.4  20.7  20.3 
– Utilities  14.8  16.7  16.8  16.4  11.6  12.4  12.1  12.9 
– Insurance 
   (incl. health insurance) 
 14.1  15.1  15.8  14.8  13.6  14.5  14.6  15.9 
– Transportation  8.7  8.3  8.2  6.6  8.7  8.1  7.5  6.6 
– House cleaning/ gardening  2.4  2.7  3.6  5.2  2.4  2.4  2.3  3.3 
– Family vacations (leisure)  1.6  1.2  0.2  0.0  9.0  10.7  11.0  9.7 
– Childcare  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 
– Other  10.2  9.9  10.1  8.2  7.0  6.3  7.0  6.2 
Medical  1.6  2.2  2.5  4.1  1.7  2.8  3.0  3.5 
Personal  25.4  23.9  23.7  26.4  22.5  22.3  21.9  21.7 
– Clothing  5.8  5.1  5.1  5.7  6.5  6.8  6.2  6.8 
– Food away from home  5.0  4.2  3.8  3.5  3.6  3.0  2.6  2.4 
– Personal leisure  4.4  4.2  4.2  3.6  3.7  3.5  3.3  2.7 
– Gifts  2.9  3.5  4.3  7.6  3.0  3.6  4.5  5.1 
– Personal care  2.6  2.6  2.8  2.9  2.8  2.9  2.9  3.1 
– Tobacco  2.3  2.0  1.3  0.9  1.2  1.2  1.1  0.2 
– Education  1.0  0.7  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2 
– Other  1.4  1.6  1.9  2.1  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.1 
Total monthly expenditures  1178  1200  1212  1286  2133  2069  2036  1940 
 (494)  (539)  (620)  (673)  (800)  (897)  (826)  (822) 
Financial satisfaction  
(scale 0-10) 
 6.1  6.3  6.8  7.4  6.8  7.0  7.4  7.5 
 (2.0)  (2.1)  (1.9)  (1.6)  (1.6)  (1.7)  (1.3)  (1.3) 
Observations  1047  587  446  276  1076  637  533  185 
Source: LISS 2009-2012. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Prevalence and distribution of different health measures
 Variable  mean  sd  p5  p50  p95 
Age < 65      
General health  1.93  0.75  1  2  3 
Mental health  25.48  16.91  4  20  60 
Functional ability  4.56  8.18  0  1  21 
Chronic conditions  0.53  0.96  0  0  3 
     
Poor general health  0.17  0.38  0  0  1 
Poor mental health  0.16  0.37  0  0  1 
Poor functional ability  0.08  0.26  0  0  1 
> 2 Chronic conditions  0.09  0.28  0  0  1 
> 3 Chronic conditions  0.03  0.17  0  0  0 
Age ≥ 65      
General health  2.08  0.7  1  2  3 
Mental health  22.71  15.7  4  20  52 
Functional ability  7.57  9.14  0  5  26 
Chronic conditions  1.49  1.33  0  1  4 
     
Poor general health  0.24  0.42  0  0  1 
Poor mental health  0.12  0.33  0  0  1 
Poor functional ability  0.14  0.35  0  0  1 
> 2 Chronic conditions  0.31  0.46  0  0  1 
> 3 Chronic conditions  0.13  0.34  0  0  1 
Notes: LISS panel 2009-2017. 
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Table 3: Estimates of the effect of health on household expenditures.  
Dependent variable: logarithm of total non-medical household expenditures.
  General health  General health 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 RE  FE  RE  FE 
Poor health dummy  -0.02 *  -0.028 **  -0.023 **  -0.029 ** 
 (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Age 35-44  0.142 ***  0.111 **  0.14 ***  0.11 ** 
 (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.040) 
Age 45-54  0.139 ***  0.127 **  0.133 ***  0.125 ** 
 (0.024)  (0.048)  (0.023)  (0.048) 
Age 55-64  0.155 ***  0.172 **  0.145 ***  0.17 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.054)  (0.023)  (0.054) 
Age 65-74  0.156 ***  0.164 **  0.145 ***  0.161 ** 
 (0.028)  (0.062)  (0.028)  (0.062) 
Age 75 and over  0.142 ***  0.142 **  0.128 ***  0.139 ** 
 (0.030)  (0.071)  (0.030)  (0.071) 
Year 2010  -0.073 ***  -0.073 ***  -0.073 ***  -0.073 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Year 2012  -0.082 ***  -0.087 ***  -0.081 ***  -0.087 *** 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Year 2015  -0.139 ***  -0.149 ***  -0.152 ***  -0.154 *** 
 (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Year 2017  -0.167 ***  -0.176 ***  -0.181 ***  -0.182 *** 
 (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
Couple 0.296 *** 0.268 *** 0.282 *** 0.263 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.050)  (0.020)  (0.050) 
Single female  0.044 **  0.29 **  0.042 **  0.287 ** 
 (0.017)  (0.091)  (0.017)  (0.091) 
ln disposable income  0.323 ***  0.181 ***  0.322 ***  0.18 *** 
 (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.028) 
Retired  0.031 *  0.017  0.032 *  0.018 
 (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.025) 
Household members  0.047 ***  0.062 ***  0.047 ***  0.063 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.017) 
Homeowner  0.161 ***  0.094 **  0.16 ***  0.094 ** 
 (0.014)  (0.044)  (0.014)  (0.044) 
Higher education  0.08 ***  -0.008  0.076 ***  -0.009 
 (0.013)  (0.058)  (0.013)  (0.058) 
ln medical spending    0.014 ***  0.005 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant  4.022 ***  5.121 ***  4.017 ***  5.119 *** 
 (0.124)  (0.219)  (0.123)  (0.219) 
Number of observations  6738  6738  6738  6738 
Number of households  2116  2116  2116  2116 
R-squared  0.53  0.41  0.54  0.42 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are from the LISS panel 2009-2017. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the effect of health on household expenditures. Dependent vari-
able: logarithm of total non-medical household expenditures.
  Mental health  Functional disability  Chronic conditions 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE
Poor health dummy  -0.021 **  -0.02  -0.041 **  -0.049 **  -0.038 **  -0.073 ** 
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.029) 
Age 35-44  0.138 ***  0.112 **  0.14 ***  0.111 **  0.139 ***  0.109 ** 
 (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.040) 
Age 45-54  0.131 ***  0.128 **  0.134 ***  0.125 **  0.132 ***  0.123 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.048)  (0.023)  (0.048)  (0.023)  (0.048) 
Age 55-64  0.142 ***  0.174 **  0.147 ***  0.17 **  0.145 ***  0.167 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.055)  (0.023)  (0.054)  (0.023)  (0.055) 
Age 65-74  0.142 ***  0.166 **  0.149 ***  0.162 **  0.148 ***  0.162 ** 
 (0.028)  (0.062)  (0.028)  (0.062)  (0.028)  (0.062) 
Age 75 and over  0.123 ***  0.143 **  0.134 ***  0.142 **  0.132 ***  0.142 ** 
 (0.030)  (0.071)  (0.030)  (0.071)  (0.030)  (0.071) 
Year 2010  -0.074 ***  -0.074 ***  -0.074 ***  -0.073 ***  -0.074 ***  -0.073 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Year 2012  -0.082 ***  -0.088 ***  -0.081 ***  -0.086 ***  -0.081 ***  -0.085 *** 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Year 2015  -0.154 ***  -0.157 ***  -0.152 ***  -0.153 ***  -0.152 ***  -0.152 *** 
 (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Year 2017  -0.181 ***  -0.184 ***  -0.18 ***  -0.18 ***  -0.18 ***  -0.178 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
Couple  0.281 ***  0.263 ***  0.283 ***  0.262 ***  0.281 ***  0.261 *** 
 (0.020)  (0.051)  (0.020)  (0.050)  (0.020)  (0.051) 
Single female  0.042 **  0.29 **  0.043 **  0.3 ***  0.041 **  0.294 ** 
 (0.017)  (0.089)  (0.017)  (0.089)  (0.017)  (0.091) 
ln disposable income  0.323 ***  0.181 ***  0.321 ***  0.181 ***  0.324 ***  0.182 *** 
 (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.028) 
Retired  0.031 *  0.018  0.03 *  0.018  0.031 *  0.017 
 (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.025) 
Household members  0.048 ***  0.063 ***  0.047 ***  0.062 ***  0.047 ***  0.063 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.017) 
Homeowner  0.16 ***  0.094 **  0.159 ***  0.095 **  0.16 ***  0.092 ** 
 (0.014)  (0.044)  (0.014)  (0.044)  (0.014)  (0.044) 
Higher education  0.076 ***  -0.009  0.075 ***  -0.009  0.075 ***  -0.008 
 (0.013)  (0.058)  (0.013)  (0.058)  (0.013)  (0.058) 
ln medical spending  0.014 ***  0.004  0.014 ***  0.005  0.014 ***  0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant  4.012 ***  5.105 ***  4.022 ***  5.104 ***  4.001 ***  5.102 *** 
 (0.123)  (0.219)  (0.123)  (0.219)  (0.123)  (0.219) 
Number of observations  6738  6738  6738  6738  6738  6738 
Number of households  2116  2116  2116  2116  2116  2116 
R-squared  0.54  0.42  0.54  0.41  0.54  0.41 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are from the LISS panel 2009-2017. 
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Table 5: Fixed effects estimates of the effect of health on household expenditures. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of total non-medical household expenditures.
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 General  Mental  Functional  Chronic 
Year < 2015  -0.043 **  -0.025 *  -0.057 **  -0.09 ** 
 (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.034) 
Year ≥ 2015  -0.021  -0.011  -0.058 **  -0.099 *** 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.030) 
β < 2015 = β ≥ 2015; p-value  0.19  0.47  0.96  0.74 
Number of observations  6738  6738  6738  6738 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are from the LISS panel 2009-2017. 
Each regression also contains controls for age effects as well as household demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, including marital status, number of household members, logarithm 
of income, homeownership status, retirement status, and a dummy variable denoting whether the 
key respondent attained higher education. All specifications also contain the control variable 
logarithm of medical expenditures. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the effect of health on household financial satisfaction.
  General health  General health 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 RE  FE  RE  FE 
Poor health dummy  -0.425 ***  -0.125 **  -0.424 ***  -0.123 ** 
 (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.050)  (0.057) 
Age 35-44  -0.101  -0.039  -0.108  -0.049 
 (0.106)  (0.185)  (0.106)  (0.186) 
Age 45-54  0.004  0.019  -0.003  0.007 
(0.100)  (0.223)  (0.100) (0.223)
Age 55-64  0.033  -0.103  0.025  -0.118 
 (0.096)  (0.250)  (0.097)  (0.250) 
Age 65-74  0.36 **  0.115  0.352 **  0.1 
 (0.116)  (0.279)  (0.117)  (0.279) 
Age 75 and over  0.597 ***  0.088  0.59 ***  0.075 
 (0.128)  (0.306)  (0.129)  (0.307) 
Year 2010  -0.026  -0.029  -0.023  -0.024 
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Year 2012  -0.035  -0.041  -0.031  -0.033 
 (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.050) 
Year 2015  0.04  0.063  0.048  0.074 
 (0.049)  (0.059)  (0.052)  (0.062) 
Year 2017  0.112 **  0.166 **  0.12 **  0.179 ** 
 (0.055)  (0.067)  (0.058)  (0.070) 
Couple  0.079  -0.089  0.064  -0.112 
 (0.089)  (0.218)  (0.090)  (0.219) 
Single female  0.094  -0.422  0.092  -0.447 
 (0.085)  (0.652)  (0.085)  (0.654) 
ln disposable income  1.368 ***  1.005 ***  1.352 ***  0.991 *** 
 (0.078)  (0.125)  (0.081)  (0.126) 
Retired  0.185 **  0.106  0.184 **  0.106 
 (0.079)  (0.105)  (0.079)  (0.105) 
Household members  -0.216 ***  -0.154 **  -0.219 ***  -0.159 ** 
 (0.035)  (0.064)  (0.035)  (0.064) 
Homeowner  0.468 ***  0.122  0.459 ***  0.114 
 (0.066)  (0.166)  (0.067)  (0.166) 
Higher education  0.191 ***  0.128  0.187 **  0.128 
 (0.057)  (0.172)  (0.057)  (0.171) 
ln medical spending    0  0.001 
   (0.012)  (0.013) 
ln non-medical 
spending 
   0.05  0.081 
   (0.057)  (0.069) 
Constant  -3.835 ***  -0.612  -4.044 ***  -1.026 
 (0.578)  (0.975)  (0.610)  (1.030) 
Number of observations  6158  6158  6158  6158 
Number of households  2071  2071  2071  2071 
R-squared  0.29  0.23  0.29  0.23 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Data are from the LISS panel 2009-2017. 
Dependent variable: 11-point measure of the degree to which the key respondent feels satisfied 
with his/her financial situation. 
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Table 7: Estimates of the effect of health on household financial satisfaction.
  Mental health  Functional ability  Chronic conditions 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE
Poor health dummy  -0.405 ***  -0.18 **  -0.502 ***  -0.093  -0.102  0.066 
 (0.053)  (0.060)  (0.077)  (0.090)  (0.098)  (0.144) 
Age 35-44  -0.128  -0.045  -0.094  -0.04  -0.116  -0.037 
 (0.104)  (0.182)  (0.108)  (0.186)  (0.109)  (0.186) 
Age 45-54  -0.038  0.019  0.007  0.016  -0.027  0.026 
 (0.100)  (0.220)  (0.102)  (0.224)  (0.103)  (0.223) 
Age 55-64  -0.035  -0.106  0.042  -0.11  -0.009  -0.098 
 (0.097)  (0.247)  (0.099)  (0.251)  (0.100)  (0.250) 
Age 65-74  0.291 **  0.114  0.386 **  0.112  0.326 **  0.123 
 (0.117)  (0.278)  (0.118)  (0.280)  (0.119)  (0.280) 
Age 75 and over  0.488 ***  0.083  0.637 ***  0.086  0.537 ***  0.092 
 (0.128)  (0.305)  (0.130)  (0.307)  (0.131)  (0.307) 
Year 2010  -0.024  -0.024  -0.03  -0.026  -0.029  -0.027 
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Year 2012  -0.034  -0.035  -0.031  -0.035  -0.037  -0.041 
 (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.050) 
Year 2015  0.032  0.065  0.046  0.071  0.038  0.061 
 (0.052)  (0.062)  (0.052)  (0.063)  (0.052)  (0.063) 
Year 2017  0.123 **  0.176 **  0.124 **  0.177 **  0.119 **  0.166 ** 
 (0.057)  (0.070)  (0.058)  (0.071)  (0.058)  (0.071) 
Couple  0.045  -0.087  0.058  -0.122  0.012  -0.133 
 (0.091)  (0.220)  (0.091)  (0.219)  (0.092)  (0.220) 
Single female  0.102  -0.464  0.11  -0.424  0.092  -0.437 
 (0.085)  (0.669)  (0.085)  (0.665)  (0.087)  (0.667) 
ln disposable income  1.365 ***  0.995 ***  1.361 ***  0.996 ***  1.389 ***  0.995 *** 
 (0.080)  (0.126)  (0.082)  (0.126)  (0.082)  (0.126) 
Retired  0.174 **  0.113  0.167 **  0.105  0.176 **  0.106 
 (0.080)  (0.105)  (0.078)  (0.105)  (0.080)  (0.106) 
Household members  -0.211 ***  -0.157 **  -0.219 ***  -0.16 **  -0.216 ***  -0.161 ** 
 (0.035)  (0.064)  (0.035)  (0.064)  (0.035)  (0.064) 
Homeowner  0.458 ***  0.123  0.458 ***  0.114  0.479 ***  0.111 
 (0.067)  (0.165)  (0.067)  (0.166)  (0.069)  (0.167) 
Higher education  0.195 ***  0.127  0.185 **  0.125  0.2 ***  0.124 
 (0.058)  (0.170)  (0.058)  (0.172)  (0.058)  (0.172) 
ln medical spending  -0.006  -0.001  -0.004  0  -0.005  0 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
ln non-medical 
spending 
 0.052  0.079  0.047  0.081  0.062  0.085 
 (0.057)  (0.069)  (0.057)  (0.069)  (0.057)  (0.069) 
Constant  -4.117 ***  -1.072  -4.135 ***  -1.099  -4.462 ***  -1.122 
 (0.607)  (1.029)  (0.614)  (1.031)  (0.623)  (1.030) 
Number of observations  6158  6158  6158  6158  6158  6158 
Number of households  2071  2071  2071  2071  2071  2071 
R-squared  0.28  0.23  0.28  0.22  0.26  0.21 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Data are from the LISS panel 2009-2017. 
Dependent variable: 11-point measure of the degree to which the key respondent feels satisfied 
with his/her financial situation. 
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Table 8: Fixed effect estimates of the effect of health on household financial 
satisfaction.
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 General  Mental  Functional  Chronic 
Year < 2015  -0.147 **  -0.208 **  -0.077  0.052 
 (0.070)  (0.066)  (0.108)  (0.158) 
Year ≥ 2015  -0.099  -0.125  -0.111  0.073 
(0.074)  (0.088)  (0.110)  (0.152) 
β < 2015 = β ≥ 2015; p-value  0.58  0.37  0.78  0.86 
Observations  6158  6158  6158  6158 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Data are from the LISS panel 2009-2017. 
Dependent variable: 11-point measure of the degree to which the key respondent feels satisfied 
with his/her financial situation. Each regression also contains controls for age effects as well as 
household demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, including marital status, number of 
household members, logarithm of income, homeownership status, retirement status, and a 
dummy variable denoting whether the key respondent attained higher education. 
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